It's a testing time for Western policymakers as they try to get to grips with an increasingly politically diverse Middle East. While they declare support for more democratic forms of government in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Syria, they are also seeking to maintain traditional alliances with governments none too keen on democratic change. No wonder the theory of monarchical exceptionalism -- that Arab monarchies are somehow more resilient to political challenges than their republican counterparts -- is becoming so popular. But is it true?

The idea that Arab monarchies in the Gulf, Jordan and Morocco are more likely to survive has gained currency since the Arab Spring, based on the observation that only republican leaders have been overthrown to date. This is true as far as it goes, but it is a short-term view ignoring the fact that most of the republics -- including Egypt, Iraq and Libya, all of which saw their hereditary rulers overthrown by coups in the 1950s and 1960s -- were monarchies once too. It seems more likely that today's monarchies have remained in place because they are resilient, rather than being resilient because they are monarchies.

To understand this resilience, analysts need to look at other factors: the loyalty of the armed forces; the opposition's effectiveness; and support received from larger powers. Indeed these factors may help to explain why some republican governments, such as Algeria's, have also contained protest pressures to date.

The monarchical exceptionalism theory might obscure significant differences between the royal regimes in the eight Arab countries that have them and overstate the differences with republican regimes.

Two arguments are made in favour of the resilience of monarchy. First, that they enjoy a legitimacy that more recently formed republics do not, with their own established methods of consultation and consensus-building, and, especially in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, claims to religious legitimacy. Second, that the monarchies are better equipped to adapt and reform, and have European models to follow where rulers have ceded power gradually while retaining status and dignity as national figureheads.

One problem with the first argument is that perceptions of royal legitimacy are difficult to evaluate in political contexts which lack reliable opinion polls or a free press, and which typically have laws against 'insulting the ruler'. Any claim that the Arab awakenings have passed the monarchies by is off the mark. That said, it would also be incorrect to assume that all who live under non-democratic governments necessarily sees themselves as oppressed.

Certainly, there is opposition activity in all of the Arab monarchies, but to varying degrees. Opposition MPs won 70 per cent of seats in Kuwait's 2012 parliamentary elections, and 45 per cent of the vote in Bahrain's 2010 election. The main Bahraini opposition group now boycotts the parliament because of its weakness, as do Islamist movements in Jordan and in Morocco, where more conciliatory Islamists, nonetheless, won more than a quarter of seats in 2011. Since the start of 2011, six out of eight of the monarchies have seen protests. These have been most pronounced in Bahrain but have also contributed to constitutional changes in Jordan, Morocco and Oman, as well as the dismissal of the cabinet in Kuwait. Moreover, activists, writers and bloggers have been tried and jailed for 'insulting' or 'slandering' governments or rulers in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and most recently Oman.

Yet in most cases protests have not been directed against the system of monarchy. Pragmatic activists are seeking political reform under the existing rulers, by calling for a genuine constitutional monarchy where the ruler's powers are circumscribed by a stronger parliament, independent judiciary or an elected government.

The legacy of tradition will not guarantee that sovereigns are immune forever. One of the lessons of the Arab awakenings has been that a heavy-handed state response to protests can lead to an escalation in protesters' demands.

This brings us to the second argument -- that monarchies have more options for power-sharing. There is value in the idea that monarchies have a range of options to develop their political systems in an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, manner. But this does not mean their survival is inevitable. It means their continuation depends on actions, adaptation and reforms -- both to accommodate the changing aspirations of a fast-growing, young and increasingly globally aware citizenry, and to build sustainable economic models. The theory should be a spur to reform, not an excuse for complacency.

Jane Kinninmont is Senior Research Fellow at the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme.

Twitter: @ihavenet

(c) 2012 Tribune Media Services, Inc.