By Jane Kinninmont

Few countries are born with the myriad of problems that face the world's newest country, South Sudan. After the suffering of decades of civil war and centuries of marginalisation, it might be hard to imagine that independence can be anything other than a hugely positive moment - but South Sudan's challenges are daunting.

It will not be the biggest global powers - including the United States (US) and China - who will have most influence in the new country, but South Sudan's neighbours. It will also be these regional neighbours, not the global powers, who will suffer most if South Sudan runs into trouble. In the event of a war between the two Sudans, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda will bear a significant cost in hosting displaced people and in dealing with the compromise to their own economic interests. And despite all the excitement of raising South Sudan's flag outside the United Nations, and opening embassies across the world, it is in the Greater Horn of Africa that the new country will alter the historical balance of power.

The decades of civil war between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) six years ago had significant international involvement. It is unlikely that the SPLA would have been in a position to force the government to the negotiating table without the support, including direct military interventions, of (at different times) Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea and Kenya, as well as a powerful lobby in the United States. These interventions were vital in securing military successes, and diplomatic pressure from the region remained important through the peace negotiations and the transitional period up to independence. The civil wars that have been fought in Sudan since independence are a reaction to the long trend of marginalisation of Sudan's peripheral regions and peoples. Many of the conflicts in Darfur or the East of Sudan have a similar genesis to the problems that faced South Sudan.

All of these conflicts have involved the intervention of neighbours, including Chad in Darfur and Eritrea in the East. Meanwhile, Khartoum has not been above supporting rebel movements in neighbouring countries. This history of mutual meddling is long and a crucial element of relations between states in the Greater Horn, and this is unlikely to change. The interest in each other's internal affairs is not always negative. The CPA mandated a six-year transitional period during which Sudan was to iron out the final details of the relationship between North and South and try to make 'unity attractive'. At many times the prospect of getting through this period without violence seemed unlikely, especially as the referendum on self determination, and then independence, grew closer and the stakes rose. Regional neighbours played a crucial role in mediating between Juba and Khartoum.

Ethiopia in particular has recently been key in pushing for peaceful resolution. Ethiopia shares a border with North and South Sudan, and would have much to lose if the peace failed. But it is also true that both Khartoum and Juba realise that a good relationship with their much larger neighbour is vital for their own future prosperity, and this gives Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia's prime minister, particular influence.

These relationships will remain central to South Sudan's international strategy - for all the economic might of the US or European Union (EU), it will be the countries of the Greater Horn who can have the biggest impact on South Sudan.

The six-year transitional period from the signing of the CPA to independence was supposed to provide time to resolve a series of key issues. However, that has not been the case. There remain disputes over the borderline between the two countries and how that border will be managed. But the crucial area of continuing disagreement is over oil. Most oil lies in South Sudan (although some reservoirs do cross the international boundary) but the pipeline and refineries that turn oil into currency are in North Sudan. Up to now revenue from Southern oil has been split 50/50, and neither country can afford a situation where failure to agree a deal shuts off the oil and cash flow (over 95 percent of South Sudan's revenue comes from oil and the figure for Sudan is around thirty to forty percent).

So the biggest problem facing South Sudan is still its relationship with Khartoum and North Sudan. The consequences of this relationship going wrong would be catastrophic for the new country. No other country has quite the same ability to derail the new state.

The potential for disputes to quickly escalate into a wider conflict was illustrated by the case of Abyei, a contested border region in the North Sudanese state of South Kordofan. In the run up to independence, events quickly got out of hand in Abyei, and tens of thousands of people were forced from their homes. Abyei is of particular cultural and political significance to both sides and ownership of the region has always been one of the most contentious issues between the North and the South. Ethiopian troops under a UN mandate are now arriving to demilitarise the area while negotiations continue. The long border between the two countries, oil resources that cross the border, populations living in each other's countries, grazing lands which have long been shared and extensive commercial ties, mean Sudan and South Sudan cannot just ignore each other. Fortunately they have agreed to continue negotiations on these shared problems under the continued direction of Thabo Mbeki and the African Union.

Potentially easier relationships lie to the east and south of South Sudan. Outside of the oil industry, the country's economy is essentially a blank slate and there has been very little alternative economic activity. Small traders and business people from neighbouring countries have begun arriving to establish hotels, taxi firms and to import food stuffs.

Although immigrants from the region generate some hostility from local South Sudanese who see them benefiting from new opportunities, things have begun to change - the motorbike taxis or boda-bodas originally run by Ugandans have been taken over by local drivers, and as the economy picks up it is likely that more and more locals will fill the less skilled jobs.

Running the new country is a daunting challenge and addressing the lack of skilled workers in government in South Sudan is a crucial area where the region can help. Members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) - a regional organisation of states in the Horn of Africa - will be sending civil servants to Juba to mentor employees in ministries there.

This effort - while very welcome for the overstretched ministries in Juba - will not mask the decreasing importance of IGAD, as the East African Community (EAC) emerges as the major economic driver in the region. IGAD played a central role in the CPA negotiations but has become less influential as it is increasingly dominated by Ethiopian interests and undermined by the Ethiopia / Eritrea dispute.

The real opportunity for South Sudan lies in tapping into bigger economic changes in East Africa. The EAC (including Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) is one of the most successful economic groupings in Africa, and with its members' economies growing fast South Sudan is keen to join. Businesses and economists see East Africa as an area with growing potential - Tanzania alone is projected to have the world's 5th largest population by 2100. Even the government in Khartoum is rumoured to be seeking to find a way to join the EAC. Already most food and manufactured goods in South Sudan come via Uganda and Kenya, and many South Sudanese have been educated in East Africa. Joining the EAC will be a priority for the government in Juba.

Inevitably with Sudan splitting in two the influence of Khartoum in the region will be diminished, but only some of the lost clout will pass to South Sudan. In the near future at least, the real winner will be Ethiopia. The peacekeeping mission in Abyei will bolster Ethiopia's reputation as a reliable partner of the international community and the emergence of South Sudan will give Ethiopia a new partner in international disputes - including over the waters of the Nile.

Ethiopia has developed close relations with both Khartoum and Juba in an effort to prevent either from getting closer with its arch-rival, Eritrea. Ethiopia will want to use its influence in both capitals to secure peace between the two Sudans and ensure that oil from Sudan continues to flow to Ethiopia.

The independence of South Sudan comes with massive challenges - building an economy almost from scratch, dealing with the legacies of war and forging relations with a difficult neighbour in the north. The lives of the South Sudanese people will be profoundly changed by independence, but the ramifications for relations between states in the region will be equally deep and long-lasting.

(Roger Middleton is a Consultant Researcher with the Africa Programme, Chatham House.)

 

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