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By Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik
On December 12, 2010, Kosovo held its first general election since declaring independence from Serbia in 2008. The elections were a test of Kosovo's democratic institutions - unfortunately, they are unlikely to be remembered as a resounding success.
Allegations of fraud and corruption have resulted in re-runs in several municipalities, and according to Kosovo's
Kosovo has always had a Euro-Atlantic orientation - it is officially a potential candidate for accession to the
Certainly, the elections were met with enthusiasm - weeks before, on social media networks and popular Kosovan youth blogs such as Kosovo 2.0, there was a sense of excitement and optimism. International observers had high hopes for election day, and it appeared that not many people inKosovo itself were expecting any significant problems. However, what was supposed to be a quiet election, which would not dramatically change the incumbent government's structure, took a turn for the worse.
Past Parties
In autumn 2010, the ruling coalition collapsed and new elections were organised in only forty days. This time around, a similar composition of the government was anticipated, with the majority of votes going to Hashim Thaci's party, the
The CEC listed twenty-nine political parties and already formed coalitions standing in the election. The main contenders were the major parties of Kosovo politics. The PDK, which led the coalition government before the elections with Thaci at the helm, was formed in 1999 from the political wing of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The PDK has traditionally been the largest party in Kosovo, followed closely by its main rival, the
Aside from the three main contenders, several smaller parties were also in the running in the December election:
There are several Serb parties, the majority of which have their headquarters in Serb-only enclaves. In the pre-December 2010 government, minority ministers were included in most parliamentary committees, but were particularly well represented in the Integration and Refugee Return group. Historically, Serb participation in Kosovo elections is a mixed picture. Politicians from Serbia proper discourage Kosovo Serbs from voting, but some local parties, such as the largest Independent Liberal party (SLS), campaign vigorously for Serb participation.
Mistakes Made
In principle, Kosovo was very well set up to run free and fair elections: an active and interesting landscape of political parties and coalitions; a guaranteed minority representation, a large number of young and energetic voters, and on top of that, the watchful eye of the international community's election observers.
Since December 12 proceeded without incident, all appeared to have gone well. In fact, Hashim Thaci celebrated his victory on December 13, and the EU's Catherine Ashton and Herman von Roumpoy issued a statement congratulating Kosovo on its well run election. But the very same day allegations of mass electoral fraud began to emerge, with electoral observers, NGOs and foreign diplomats all expressing their concern.
The first indication that something was amiss was the report by the CEC that the municipality of Skenderaj sawa 94 percent voter turnout, and Glogovac 86 percent. In 2009, the CEC reports, the national average turnout for local elections was 47 percent. In addition to these extremely high figures, the respected Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) uploaded films onto the Balkan Insight website on December 13, one of which appeared to show an election official in a village in Skenderaj changing already cast ballots during the vote count. Across Kosovo, teams of election observers also commented on voter lists which appeared to list deceased and émigrés. They also observed group or family voting, and inaccurate candidate lists.
The fraud allegations led to a number of political parties and civil society actors contesting the results and filing 170 official complaints. As a result, forty percent of polling stations held recounts, and re-runs were arranged for several municipalities: Skenderaj, Glogovac, Decan and Mitrovica. A number of polling stations in Lipljan and Malisevo municipalites held reruns throughout December. Of these, only Mitrovica (that is, only Mitrovica's northern part), lie in the Serb-controlled North.
Ethnic Divisions
In line with previous election patterns, it was anticipated that the PDK would win thirty to forty percent of the vote, forming a coalition with one of the smaller parties. Early exit polls broadly followed this trend and preliminary results on December 13 indicated a 33.5 percent of the vote for the PDK and 23.6 percent for the LDK. However, the re-runs in Skenderaj and Glogovac may yet have an impact on the final results. It would appear that the voter turnout in these municipalities fell to 62 and 59 percent although this effect cannot be ascertained until the official results are published in February.
Despite legal provisions made for Kosovo's minorities, communities still tend to live in mono-ethnic villages and neighbourhoods. The political landscape does nothing to challenge this view. For instance, there are no Serbs in the PDK or LDK, and there are no Albanians in Serb parties such as the
In the December election, it is reported that voter turn out in Leposavic, a Serb-dominanted municipality in Kosovo's north, was only 1.5 percent. Kosovo's north, where a majority of the Serb population lives, has operated on a system of 'parallel institutions' financed by Belgrade since 2000. Serbia has a strong political influence there, and its
Whilst in the north this seems to have been a message taken seriously, elsewhere in Kosovo, there is strong indication that Serbs are not following the Belgrade line. In the south, Serbs tend to live in much smaller and more isolated enclaves than north Mitrovica and Leposavic, which border Serbia. According to recent reports from the
Nevertheless, there is an indication that the general politics of Serb political parties may be changing. Whilst re-runs were being held, the Serb SLS party expressed its wish to form a coalition with Hashim Thaci. This could perhaps be the single most significant development to emerge from this election. In addition to the widespread boycotts of Kosovo elections, Serbs' guaranteed representation in parliament could have resulted in complacency that led to low turnout. But, the mere suggestion by a major Serb party of the possibility of forming a coalition may alter the perception of Kosovo Serbs - rather than isolating themselves in Serb enclaves, they may finally feel that they form an integral part of independent Kosovo. It is even more encouraging that the largest Serb political party does not bill itself in ethnic terms - its party logo of yellow stars on a blue background is reminiscent both of the new Kosovo flag and the EULEX mission.
Importantly, the election revealed a lot about the state of Kosovo's democracy via its media and its handling of election fraud. Pro-Thaci media, such as RIK, the public service broadcaster Radio Television Kosovo, TV21 and Express newspaper, which have a monopoly on the media landscape, have not only published the preliminary election results as a statement of fact, but have generally ignored accusations of electoral fraud, reporting that the election was held in a fair and regular manner.
Fortunately for Kosovo, the media boasts a number of quality outlets such as the daily Koha Ditore. Other publications, such as Zeri and Vetevendosje's eponymous paper, were very active in publishing fraud allegations and criticism of the international community. Kosovo's diverse media is encouraging for the country's future democratic outlook, but less encouraging is Thaci's lack of engagement with fraud allegations and his supporters' media doing the same.
The election has demonstrated that Kosovo's political landscape, whilst active and lively, is virtually monolithic, making it difficult for non-mainstream, non-minority parties to have a seat in parliament or exert much influence.
Contemporary politics in Kosovo has largely been shaped by the 1999 war and the Albanian struggle for independence. Such deeply traumatic and difficult times inevitably affect the development of 'normal' politics and functioning democratic institutions - this is unlikely to change in this generation. For the Serbs, living through this period has resulted in a politics of fear and isolation, whilst for Albanians the focus on independence has displaced all other political concerns. Now that statehood has been achieved, Kosovo's politicians must play catch up - the people of Kosovo need progress, transparency and democracy.
But, the political leaders of Kosovo have not yet taken obligations of statehood and democracy seriously, as Thaci has repeatedly demonstrated with his refusal to address electoral problems. Kosovo has a young, educated and increasingly well-informed population. Eventually this generation will demand accountability and maturity from its politicians. The current dissatisfaction with precisely this issue is evident - Vetevendosje, which has a strong support base amongst the young, is estimated to have gained twelve percent of the vote.
The overall effect of the elections - final results pending - is unlikely to have a significant effect on the overall political landscape in Kosovo. Even if the PDK and LDK lose some of their support, they are still likely to dominate. Furthermore, the broadly similar agendas of other political parties in Kosovo will also have no bearing on any significant changes after the final results are in. Kosovo politics is still dominated by 'the old guard' - men who fought for independence, or who have inherited ideological legacies of that period. Kosovo's young, bright politicians are mainly confined to the margins, and due to the dominance of the pre-independence politics, they are unlikely to be in a position to exert much influence any time soon. The main political change may come from an interesting coalition, but whilst this would go some way towards easing ethnic tensions and making north Kosovo feel more included in the state, there is a question mark over whether the PDK, or any other Albanian party, would be willing to form a coalition with the Serbs.
(Dr. Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at
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