Bronwyn Bruton

The U.S. government needs to change its Somalia policy--and fast. For the better part of two decades, international attempts to create a government have failed. And since 9/11, U.S. attempts to prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda have visibly backfired, alienating the Somali population, and propelling an indigenous Salafi jihadist group, called al Shabab, to power.

Alarmingly, the State Department seems unwilling to recognize the failures of past policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is clinging to the bankrupt strategy of supporting Somalia's notional Transitional Federal Government. But the TFG has been categorically rejected as a proxy of the West by the bulk of Somalia's armed political opposition, and though it's clearly won a few hearts and minds, it has failed to generate much clan or grass-roots support. The TFG's paramilitary forces--a ragtag cluster of groups beholden to various warlords with posts in the government--are a shambles. And ammunition sent by the United States and its allies to prop up these underpaid forces is allegedly finding its way to the black market and to al Shabab.

Even if the TFG were able to expand its control of territory, it would do little good: the government is simply incapable of governing. Its only real value is to provide a legitimating front for the international community's opposition to al Shabab, in the form of the African Union's mission to Somalia, known as AMISOM. But so far, this effort has been as problematic as previous international interventions in Somalia. AMISOM is widely viewed as a combatant in the conflict and its presence is a shared rallying point for extremist and nationalist groups that otherwise have little common ground.

That said, the radical camp is no better off. Al Shabab's top leaders vocally support al Qaeda, but they have less and less control over the clan factions, bandits and fundamentalist nationalists that have opportunistically swelled the movement's ranks. Al Shabab's grip on power, especially its purported control over territory, is surprisingly weak. Although it holds sway over much of the country's southern half, it does not govern so much as occupy territory through a mixture of public relations, manipulation of local clan conflicts, and outright intimidation. Al Shabab may be a brutal local political movement, but it is unlikely to evolve into a transnational terrorist organization that could threaten U.S. national security.

The presence of al Qaeda operatives in al Shabab's ranks is alarming, but it is as much a tactical as an ideological alignment. And the presence of foreign jihadists will ultimately impede al Shabab's ambitions of governing Somalia: Somalis tend to abhor the presence of foreign fighters, who are perceived as brutal modern colonizers. That hostility has wrecked al Qaeda's previous ventures into Somalia--and likely will again.

The fragility of the TFG and the radical alliance means there is no clear horse on which the U.S. government can bet. This will disappoint statebuilding advocates, who see a solution to Somalia's anarchy in the TFG. But it's also something of a blessing: it means that al Shabab is weaker than is often feared. And the implications are clear. With no side capable of keeping the peace if it wins the war, neither the United States nor its allies should focus on backing any one group. The UN should also forget about grand political projects to create a central government authority, which are likely to be futile.

Backing off entails risks, including the possibility that al Shabab will cement, if only temporarily, its hold on southern Somalia. But it's the only way to ensure that the growing tensions within al Shabab, and latent tensions between al Shabab and al Qaeda, will play out. Exploiting these tensions is the most reliable and cost-effective means of fighting terrorism in Somalia.

Washington's first step should be to learn to coexist with al Shabab. Since the movement is a coalition of fortune, it is susceptible to realignment under the right conditions, and the quickest method of creating those conditions is to open the door to coexistence with the West. Washington must then tolerate a strategic pause, and a period of uncertainty, as the process of disaggregation plays out. Only then, when anti-U.S. sentiment has subsided, will it be desirable for Washington and its allies to try to address the deeper causes of anarchy in Somalia.

Even then, policymakers will have to be extremely mindful not to revive past prescriptions, including the idea of finding and empowering national political figures in Somalia. Until Somalia's clan and resource conflicts are resolved, such efforts are a recipe for continued violence and radicalization. Instead, the U.S. should commit itself to a strategy that promotes development without regard to governance. This may not yield political outcomes that are palatable to Washington--or even ensure stability in Somalia. But it is vastly preferable to the status quo policy, which has created a devastating military stalemate in Mogadishu, helped to make Somalia's humanitarian crisis the worst in the world--and opened Somalia's door to al Qaeda.

 

 

 

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In the Quicksands of Somalia