Seth G. Jones
I met Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban ambassador to
"How long has America been in
Zaeef is largely correct.
In fact, U.S. Major General
Three new books provide important insights into that environment.
The first is Zaeef's own
My Life with the Taliban,
which serves as a counternarrative to much of what has been written about
The other two books are edited and written, respectively, by ,
Giustozzi compiles essays from journalists, former government officials, aid workers, and academics to examine the
nature of the insurgency. Some chapters offer refreshing new insights, especially those that deal with
In Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan,
Giustozzi assesses the dynamics of warlordism. The book focuses on Abdul Rashid Dostum in the north,
All three books provide a nuanced micro-level view of the country. More important, they offer a chilling prognosis for those who believe that the solution to stabilizing
THE CENTER WILL NOT HOLD
Experts on state building and counterinsurgency in
Since the Bonn agreement of
Current international efforts to establish security and stability from the center are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of
As Giustozzi convincingly argues, the well-intentioned proponents of the top-down model have survived for too long solely on an idealist's diet of
Western officials seeking to stabilize
BEYOND THE STATE
Many Western countries are characterized by strong state institutions, in which power emanates from a central authority. But in a range of countries -- including many in
A tribe or subtribe in one area may be very different in its structure and political inclinations than the same tribe or subtribe in another area. In working with leaders of the Noorzai tribe in 2009 to establish local security and basic services, for example, I found significant differences in the social and cultural practices between communities in western Herat and those in southern
Martine van Bijlert, who served as a political adviser to the
In the absence of strong government institutions, groups formed based on descent from a common ancestor help the Pashtuns organize economic production, preserve political order, and defend themselves against outside threats. These bonds tend to be weaker in urban areas, where central government control is stronger and where individuals may identify themselves with their city rather than their tribe. This phenomenon is clearly illustrated by the growing number of people who identify themselves as "Kabulis" because they live in
In Pashtun areas where tribal and subtribal relationships remain strong, they are not the only force governing local politics. Additional social structures have evolved over the past several decades because of war, drought, migration, sedentarization, and other factors. As a result, a range of other identities can transcend tribal structures, such as identities based on reputations earned during the anti-Soviet jihad, land ownership, or wealth acquired through licit or illicit activity (such as road taxes or the drug trade). In such an environment, outsiders -- especially foreign soldiers -- have a limited ability to shape local politics.
The insurgency takes advantage of this situation. It is composed of a loose amalgam of groups, such as the Taliban, allied tribes and subtribes, drug traffickers and other criminals, local powerbrokers, and state sponsors such as
THE PRINCE OF KABUL
One of the most significant contributions of all three books is their insights into the modus operandi of the insurgency. Zaeef offers a particularly interesting discussion of the Taliban's origins and the group's effectiveness in working with locals. In 1994, state authority had collapsed, and governance was fractured among a range of warlords and local commanders. A network of mullahs in southern
The Taliban moved quickly, beginning in
As Giustozzi explains in Empires of Mud, the Taliban continued to use this bottom-up strategy when they expanded beyond the south beginning in 1995. In western
Today, Taliban leaders have adopted a similar approach in fighting the Karzai government and U.S. and
Decoding the New Taliban describes this micro-level strategy in detail. Coghlan argues that in
The Taliban is not the only insurgent group that effectively uses local networks to its advantage. One of the most significant is the Haqqani network, which was established by the legendary mujahideen commander and former CIA ally
There is a common thread in many of these accounts: the Taliban and other insurgent groups have recognized the local nature of politics in
ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL
There is an urgent need to refine the international community's state-building and counterinsurgency efforts in response to the Taliban's bottom-up strategy.
One key area is security. During
These were not militias, in the sense of large offensive forces under the command of warlords, which tend to be used today in the Tajik and Uzbek areas of northern and western
U.S. and
The growing number of local tribes and communities resisting the insurgency is evidence of the Taliban's waning popularity. They range from the Noorzais, the Achakzais, and the Alikozais in the west and south to the Shinwaris, the Kharotis, and the Zadrans in the east. Afghan, U.S., and
U.S. forces have opted not to pay these local police, based on the belief that individuals should be motivated to work for their communities and not outsiders. Instead, the Afghan government and international organizations have provided development projects to participating communities. They have also established a quick-reaction force to assist local communities that come under attack from the Taliban and other insurgents. In southern
These local efforts can also have a positive impact on the defection of mid- and lower-level insurgents, which is more commonly called "reintegration." As Coghlan explains, most insurgents are not ideologically committed. Rather, they are motivated by tribal or subtribal friction, grievances against the Afghan government or U.S. and
LONG LIVE THE KING
When I last spoke with Zaeef, he remained bewildered by the international community's lack of understanding of rural
In his conclusion to Empires of Mud, Giustozzi writes that a durable peace will likely require a careful combination of top-down institutionalization and bottom-up co-optation of local leaders. Focusing only on the former has failed to help the Afghan population, which continues to feel deeply insecure because of insurgent and criminal activity. Moreover, there has been -- and will likely continue to be -- an insufficient number of U.S.,
Some worry that empowering local leaders may help the Afghan government and the international community achieve short-term goals but will undermine stability in the long run by fragmenting authority. This is an academic debate. Afghan social and cultural realities make it impossible to neglect local leaders, since they hold much of the power today.
The old monarchy's model is useful for today's
Available at Amazon.com:
Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field
Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan
At War with the Weather: Managing Large-Scale Risks in a New Era of Catastrophes
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