The repercussions of drone strikes

In 2012, Yemen was seen as the surprise success story of the Arab Spring. Diplomats congratulated themselves on delivering a deal which ushered President Ali Abdullah Saleh out of power and replaced him with his Vice-President, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. President Hadi was endo-rsed in a one-candidate election on 21 February to oversee a two-year transition process that would culminate in elections in February 2014.

Hadi began the year with a mountain to climb. The political transition sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) required him to oversee the demilitarization of Sana'a, the capital, restructure the factionalized and corrupt military and security services and bring the Yemeni people together in a 'national dialogue' to lay the groundwork for a new constitution.

Sana'a remained physically divided between rival military factions aligned to the former president and to General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, commander of the First Armoured Brigade who had defected to the opposition. Protesters, dissatisfied by the GCC deal's amnesty for regime officials, were still encamped in Change Square in the heart of the capital.

Many doubted that Hadi would be strong enough to see the process through. Yet he is gradually reshuffling -- not without resistance -- military commanders allied or related to the ex-president. The preparations for the national dialogue conference, though delayed, are also inching forwards. In June, the Yemeni army finally forced a retreat of Al-Qaeda affiliated militants occupying Zinjibar, provincial capital of Abyan, toppling the short-lived 'Islamic Emirate of Abyan'.

Yemen is still in a precarious situation. In the context of a declining economy and communities who have little faith in the central government's desire or ability to deliver development, Islamist militants have found fertile recruiting grounds.

International concern in Yemen is primarily driven by fear that a failed state would allow it to become the 'next Afghanistan', a base from where Al-Qaeda terrorists could launch attacks on the West.

After more than a decade of the 'war on terror', Al-Qaeda has found itself on the back foot in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and in Saudi Arabia. In Yemen, however, Saudi and Yemeni Al-Qaeda members have joined forces to become Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and declared holy war on the republican government in Sana'a. Despite heavy US investment in training Yemeni counter-terrorism units, the government has failed to tame AQAP. Instead, Saleh's cooperation with the Americans -- including permitting air strikes on militants -- made Yemen a legitimate theatre for jihad.

AQAP has mounted a handful of attacks on foreign targets, such as the December 2009 plot to blow up an airliner over Detroit. But it has also worked to build local sympathies, exploiting grievances over poverty, unemployment and lack of services. Its members began to use the name Ansar al-Shari'ah, distancing themselves from the Al-Qaeda brand. The US State Department now estimates that AQAP consists of a few thousand fighters -- up from 300 in 2009.

As the transition plan reaches its halfway point, it is clear that the US war against Al-Qaeda is casting a shadow over the process. The first targeted killing carried out by the US in Yemen took place in Nov-ember 2002. It was not until December 2009, however, that the war in Yemen hit the headlines, with a cruise missile strike in al-Majalah, Abyan province. This was a lethal blunder, killing 44 civilians along with 14 possible militants. Despite the outcry surrounding this attack, strikes carried out by cruise missiles, drones or fixed-wing aircraft have become the Obama administration's favoured tool for countering Al-Qaeda in Yemen. High-profile kills have included Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American cleric, in September 2011.

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported a sharp increase in US operations in Yemen in 2012, with at least 32 confirmed strikes, double the number carried out in 2011. However the total in 2012 may have been as high as 130, as attacks often take place in areas difficult to reach.

Journalists, analysts and human rights monitors are questioning the lack of transparency with which America's shadow war in Yemen is being conducted. The Obama Administration does not reveal the criteria it uses to draw up its 'kill lists', and refuses to confirm or deny the majority of the attacks it conducts.

Critics argue that this 'missile surge' will create as many AQAP supporters as it kills. In an October 2012 Washington Post article, Bruce Riedel, a former Obama administration adviser, described the drone strategy as a 'lawn mower [...] the minute you stop mowing, the grass is going to grow back'.

Some advocates of the strategy acknowledge that it is a short-term solution, but argue that there is no evidence that drone strikes have led to significant levels of radicalization. There is consensus that the long-term solution is a stable, government in Sana'a and an economy able to support rural livelihoods. But for Western governments, eliminating short-term risk is the priority. If an attack such as the 2009 Detroit bomber's were to succeed it would be a political disaster for Washington.

Nevertheless, as President Hadi climbs his political mountain, it is worth looking at how America's shadow war might be undermining the interim government. In September 2012, he publicly endorsed American drone strikes in a speech in Washington, which was heavily criticized by a number of Yemeni activists. 'We know Hadi needs international support to survive, but he risks becoming another Pervez Musharraf', said Farea al-Muslimi, a youth activist. 'Yemenis have to believe that Hadi reports to them, not to the international community,' he added.

There are sporadic reports of protests against drone strikes, in particular in areas where civilians have been killed by mistake, such as in Hadramawt and al-Bayda provinces. Protesters have complained of Sana'a's lack of acknowledgement or compensation for deaths and injuries, as well as infringement of sovereignty. These can be costly mistakes. In May 2010, when Jabr al-Shabwani, the deputy governor of Marib province, was killed by mistake, his family carried out retaliatory attacks on Marib's oil infrastructure. A Yemeni official was quoted in June 2011 as attributing $1?billion in lost revenue to the pipeline blast.

In another sign of growing discontent there has been a noticeable rise in support for the Houthi movement, the Zaydi Shi'i militants who have been engaged in an intermittent war with the Yemeni government since 2004. Their anti-American slogans are daubed on walls in the capital. Yet among the political elite in Sana'a there appears to be little appetite to challenge US counterterrorism policy. In the context of Saleh's legacy of disillusionment with political processes, this incapacity to respond to concerns about drone strikes may be undermining Yemenis' hopes for a government that represents their interests.

Currently Washington's assessment seems to be that there is not enough 'blowback' to its counterterrorism operations to warrant a policy shift. But for many Yemenis, America's shadow war is out of step with their aspirations for democratic, accountable government and the rule of law.

Leonie Northedge is Research Associate at the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme

 

 

 

(c) 2013 By Joel Brinkley, "Is the American Shadow War Helping Yemen?"