The U.S. government needs to change its Somalia policy--and fast. For the better part of two decades, international attempts to create a government have failed. And since 9/11, U.S. attempts to prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda have visibly backfired, alienating the Somali population, and propelling an indigenous Salafi jihadist group, called al Shabab, to power.

Alarmingly, the State Department seems unwilling to recognize the failures of past policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is clinging to the bankrupt strategy of supporting Somalia's notional Transitional Federal Government. But the TFG has been categorically rejected as a proxy of the West by the bulk of Somalia's armed political opposition, and though it's clearly won a few hearts and minds, it has failed to generate much clan or grass-roots support. The TFG's paramilitary forces--a ragtag cluster of groups beholden to various warlords with posts in the government--are a shambles. And ammunition sent by the United States and its allies to prop up these underpaid forces is allegedly finding its way to the black market and to al Shabab.

Even if the TFG were able to expand its control of territory, it would do little good: the government is simply incapable of governing. Its only real value is to provide a legitimating front for the international community's opposition to al Shabab, in the form of the African Union's mission to Somalia, known as AMISOM. But so far, this effort has been as problematic as previous international interventions in Somalia. AMISOM is widely viewed as a combatant in the conflict and its presence is a shared rallying point for extremist and nationalist groups that otherwise have little common ground.

That said, the radical camp is no better off. Al Shabab's top leaders vocally support al Qaeda, but they have less and less control over the clan factions, bandits and fundamentalist nationalists that have opportunistically swelled the movement's ranks. Al Shabab's grip on power, especially its purported control over territory, is surprisingly weak. Although it holds sway over much of the country's southern half, it does not govern so much as occupy territory through a mixture of public relations, manipulation of local clan conflicts, and outright intimidation. Al Shabab may be a brutal local political movement, but it is unlikely to evolve into a transnational terrorist organization that could threaten U.S. national security.

The presence of al Qaeda operatives in al Shabab's ranks is alarming, but it is as much a tactical as an ideological alignment. And the presence of foreign jihadists will ultimately impede al Shabab's ambitions of governing Somalia: Somalis tend to abhor the presence of foreign fighters, who are perceived as brutal modern colonizers. That hostility has wrecked al Qaeda's previous ventures into Somalia--and likely will again.

The fragility of the TFG and the radical alliance means there is no clear horse on which the U.S. government can bet. This will disappoint statebuilding advocates, who see a solution to Somalia's anarchy in the TFG. But it's also something of a blessing: it means that al Shabab is weaker than is often feared. And the implications are clear. With no side capable of keeping the peace if it wins the war, neither the United States nor its allies should focus on backing any one group. The UN should also forget about grand political projects to create a central government authority, which are likely to be futile.

Backing off entails risks, including the possibility that al Shabab will cement, if only temporarily, its hold on southern Somalia. But it's the only way to ensure that the growing tensions within al Shabab, and latent tensions between al Shabab and al Qaeda, will play out. Exploiting these tensions is the most reliable and cost-effective means of fighting terrorism in Somalia.

Washington's first step should be to learn to coexist with al Shabab. Since the movement is a coalition of fortune, it is susceptible to realignment under the right conditions, and the quickest method of creating those conditions is to open the door to coexistence with the West. Washington must then tolerate a strategic pause, and a period of uncertainty, as the process of disaggregation plays out. Only then, when anti-U.S. sentiment has subsided, will it be desirable for Washington and its allies to try to address the deeper causes of anarchy in Somalia.

Even then, policymakers will have to be extremely mindful not to revive past prescriptions, including the idea of finding and empowering national political figures in Somalia. Until Somalia's clan and resource conflicts are resolved, such efforts are a recipe for continued violence and radicalization. Instead, the U.S. should commit itself to a strategy that promotes development without regard to governance. This may not yield political outcomes that are palatable to Washington--or even ensure stability in Somalia. But it is vastly preferable to the status quo policy, which has created a devastating military stalemate in Mogadishu, helped to make Somalia's humanitarian crisis the worst in the world--and opened Somalia's door to al Qaeda.

Victory in Afghanistan Requires Fully Supported Counterinsurgency
James Danly

In order to declare victory, we need to aid the Afghans in establishing a legitimate government whose population does not effectively support terrorist networks. The only viable course is to commit the resources necessary to conduct a full-spectrum counterinsurgency of the kind employed to such great effect during the surge in Iraq

Counterinsurgency Cookie Cutter Doesn't Fit Afghanistan
Gian P. Gentile

'Counterinsurgency' has become the new American way of war. A once obscure theory of internal conflict, it has become ubiquitous in military circles and dominates thinking on both current and future wars. More important, its precepts are being followed without serious inquiry or examination, and the U.S. military has become so enamored with the theory that it seemingly will not consider any serious alternative methods to achieve the president's objectives in Afghanistan.

Despite Obama's Concessions, Russia Remains Unhelpful on Iran
Joshua Kucera

The Obama administration's announcement last month that it was scrapping plans to build missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic removed a prime irritant in the U.S.-Russian relationship; Russians felt the missile defense network was targeted as much at them as against the purported threat, Iran. And the move appeared at first to pay dividends. However ...

Can United States Truly Press 'Reset' Button With Russia
Ian Bremmer and Alexander Kliment

Today, Moscow and Washington elites glower at each other over a host of global disputes, and Russia, far from blossoming into the pro-Western, market-oriented democracy that the 1990s shock therapists dreamed of, has developed into a quasi-authoritarian petro-state at home, guided by zero-sum revisionist ambitions abroad.

Arrogant U.S. Misses the Message From Pakistan's People
William Pfaff

There has always been in American foreign policy circles a virus called arrogance, caused by the hereditary assumption that Americans know better than others. Surprisingly, this does not always prove the case, but the condition seems highly resistant to treatment, even by experience. There seems a high probability that the disease has struck Obama administration policy circles dealing with Pakistan

For Europe, U.S. Is Country That Cries Wolf
William Pfaff

Officials such as Philip Gordon regularly travel to Europe to ask for support for American initiatives. The Europeans reply that they have not been consulted in making these policies. The Americans say we will be happy to discuss them, but we are putting up most of the men and money, so it's too late to change anything. Maybe next time.

With al-Qaida Diminished, There's No Sense in Expanding Afghan War
William Pfaff

Al-Qaida's relations with the Taliban today are troubled. Effective counter-terrorism strategy in Afghanistan is on the brink of completely eliminating al-Qaida. There will be no organization to return. This is the result of effective international and domestic intelligence cooperation as well as good police work. So why, one asks, is the U.S. expanding its war in Afghanistan?

Afghan Mythologies
Victor Davis Hanson

As President Obama decides whether to send more troops to Afghanistan, we should remember that most of the conventional pessimism about Afghanistan is only half-truth. Remember the mantra that the region is the 'graveyard of empires,' where Alexander the Great, the British in the 19th century, and the Soviets only three decades ago inevitably met their doom?

United States: Single-eyed Vision
Robert C. Koehler

The promise the United States once represented to the world has spent itself, and what we have to offer in terms of opportunity, or at least hope, is overshadowed by the spreading shadow of our hubris. And it's all coming home to roost.

Latin America Low on Obama's Priority List
Latin American Current Events, News & Affairs - Andres Oppenheimer

One year after the election of President Barack Obama, it's time to ask whether his ambitious campaign promises about Latin America are being fulfilled, or whether, like others before him, he has placed the region at the bottom of his foreign policy priorities. Let's look at Obama's key campaign promises for Latin America

Changing North Korea
Andrei Lankov

When it comes to dealing with North Korea the United States and its allies have no efficient methods of coercion at their disposal; the regime is remarkably immune to outside pressure. Its leaders cannot afford change, so they make sure their state continues to be an international threat, using nuclear blackmail as a survival tactic while their unlucky subjects endure more poverty and terror. Since outside pressure is ineffective

(c) 2009 Bronwyn Bruton, Copyright 2009 Council on Foreign Relations, publisher of Foreign Affairs.