By Alan Philps

Ian Bremmer, author of Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World, talks to Alan Philps

Q. In your book you say that we have entered a leaderless world, a 'G-Zero' order where no single country or bloc can drive a global agenda. How will the world cope with environmental challenges?

A. Unfortunately for all of us, 'the world', won't do anything on a collective, co-ordinated basis, because there is no consensus on how responsibilities and costs should be shared among major powers. That is why the Copenhagen climate summit collapsed in 2009, and why similar gatherings in Cancun and Durban produced little of note. The G-Zero order doesn't imply that America, Europe, Britain, Japan and willing emerging states have no leadership role to play, but solutions will depend increasingly on smaller-scale partnerships - call them 'ad hoc coalitions of the like-minded and capable' - that can generate at least modest progress on transnational challenges such as climate change.

Q. Is there any point in holding summits such as Rio+20?

A. I wouldn't say these gatherings are useless. They can help clarify which governments are ready and able to move forward on a common plan, and they give non-governmental players an opportunity to advance unorthodox ideas. But if we treat them as if they offer our best hope for innovative approaches to these issues, we are bound to be disappointed. We must lower our expectations.

Q. Regional groups can tackle some issues, but how could that work with planetary challenges such as global warming?

A. Regional groupings or coalitions of the like-minded and capable will probably prove the least effective response to transnational problems, except for all the others. Of course, the same has been said of democracy and free market capitalism, but we shouldn't be in a hurry to dismiss those ideas either.

The G-Zero is an incubator of crisis. Unfortunately, as with the Second World War, it may take a common and immediate threat to force co-operation among governments with widely divergent sets of interests. But in many areas - trade, monetary policy, cyber security - regional groups can accomplish quite a lot. And we are not strictly speaking about groups that are organised by geography. It is more a question of shared goals, common threats or general like-mindedness.

Q. Already we live in a dog-eat-dog world where the poor have to endure debilitating food price swings. Is life going to get even harder for poor countries?

A. It depends on the country. Some nations will have more options as everybody wants a share in the resources they have to offer. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, countries seeking foreign investment can now choose among Western governments and the IMF/World Bank on the one hand, and emerging market powers such as China and their state-owned companies on the other. That's a prime reason why foreign direct investment in Africa grew from $9.4 billion in 2000 to more than $60 billion in 2011. Of course, those that are resource-deprived will have fewer friends and fewer options.

On a global level, the management, production and export of food and water will become highly politicized. We have already seen glimpses of the dangerous possibilities in recent years with, for example, growing political conflicts over water rights in Asia and North Africa, and Russia's politically motivated ban on grain exports. These are issues to watch closely.

Q. In a few years the world's biggest economy will be a relatively poor country. How will China's exercise of power differ from America's?

A. China will still be a poor country even after its economy becomes the largest. That is a radically different world from the one we have known.

China's foreign policy will be much more risk-averse and tactical, providing international leadership only when it suits Beijing's national interests. We won't see a 'doctrine' that dictates sweeping terms of China's involvement or the managing of its relationships. Instead, we'll see a more surgical focus on economic - and, in some cases, security - interests. We already see China's clearly stated unwillingness to get deeply into the business of providing public goods and its marginal involvement in Syria's civil war, the conflict over Iran's nuclear programme, or Europe's sovereign debt crisis.

It's not just a matter of China's willingness. Its capability is suspect, as well. Consider the situation in Sudan. After years of remaining aloof on the Darfur human rights crisis, Beijing's interest was piqued when Sudanese conflict led to a stoppage of oil exports that hit China's economy. Since South Sudan's independence, the security situation has got much worse, and China has had little success in encouraging constructive engagement and the flow of oil through the Chinese-made pipelines that cross the two countries.

In general, we can expect sharply limited engagement from China, an unwillingness to act as global policeman or lender of last resort, and diplomatic complications where China does decide to engage.

Q. How does China's view of environmental and resource challenges differ from the US's view?

A. China is in a very different place in its development. Given the need for steady growth and a continual large-scale supply of new jobs, Beijing doesn't believe it can afford to place the same value on environmental protection that we see in the West. China is an emerging power with a lot of emergence left to do. Their climate change argument makes some sense: The West did the damage, and the rest shouldn't be expected to stunt their own economic growth to make things right. The West will counter, correctly, that even if Europe and America cut emissions to zero tomorrow, the damage done by China, India and other industrializing powers will do enormous damage in years to come. We have a common problem without a commonly agreed solution.

Q. In your book, you highlight a number of countries that can 'pivot' and are well placed to thrive in a shifting balance of power. Canada, Turkey and Kazakhstan, for example. Why them?

A. These are good examples of a few of the countries that are able to avoid over-reliance for political and commercial security on ties with a single powerful partner. Canada has made solid progress in recent years in diversifying away from over-reli15ance on commercial ties with the United States towards a broader set of relation-ships in Asia. British Columbia now exports more to Asia than to the US.

Turkey's NATO membership gives its government important influence in Europe and America, but it is also an increasingly prominent voice in the politics of the Middle East and acts as a bridge that connects Europe and the Middle East with Central Asia and the former Soviet Union.

Kazakhstan takes part in a customs union with Russia and is a member of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, a security pact that includes both Russia and China. But its largest trade partner is the European Union, and it exports almost as much to Germany as to either of its powerful neighbours.

In a volatile historical moment where crisis appears from unexpected directions and develops with unexpected speed, this diversification of political and commercial partnerships makes these countries resilient as well as strong.

Q. The EU: a haven of resilience, or carrion for the rising powers?

A. It is much more a haven of resilience, though growth won't return anytime soon. The complexity of the problems implied by structural reform of the eurozone, the Continent's demographic woes, and a broad range of other challenges make both the United States and the most dynamic and resilient emerging markets look like better bets, at least for the time being.

But the eurozone isn't about to implode. Both core and peripheral countries have far too large an investment in the European idea and in the advantages that integration has created for all of them to simply walk away.

More to the point, in a crisis-prone G-Zero world, Europe has the institutional infrastructure and mature regional governance - imperfect though they are - that Asia and the Middle East lack. That will prove a crucial asset.

In the end, I believe that Europe will be the better for the painful reforms that have been undertaken. Its key actors will become more closely aligned, and the benefits of regional integration will pay dividends as other regions face heightened competition that cannot be effectively managed.

(Ian Bremmer is an American political scientist and founder of the Eurasia Group. He is the author of Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World.)

 

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