As the rival political parties in Iraq maneuver for control in the wake of March's indecisive parliamentary election, it may be a propitious time for a reminder of why American forces are supposed to be in the country.

Beyond the objective of removing those weapons of mass destruction that weren't there, the stated mission was to bring about a stable and secure government chosen by the liberated people of Iraq, after the successful removal of dictator Saddam Hussein.

The United States did not commit to playing either ally or referee in the post-deposal era. In the last intervening years, however, the clear beneficiary of the continuing American presence has been Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Since his election in 2005, he has segued from being a grateful and cooperative protege to an often-balking disciple with a penchant for demonstrating independence and, from the American view, rebelliousness.

In a sense, he has been what original high-minded U.S. sponsors said they wished for, except that the result has not been the stable and secure Iraq that former President George W. Bush sought to achieve.

Instead, two months after the parliamentary elections that were to justify removal of the last of the American combat forces by August, the country remains ensnared in an internal leadership fight, with al-Maliki struggling to stay in power.

Failure of his Shiite-dominated State of Law coalition to gain a parliamentary victory in the March 7 elections, winning only 89 seats to 91 by the Sunni-backed Iraqiya party, has obliged al-Maliki to join forces with another Shiite bloc, the Iraqi National Alliance, which won 70 seats. But 163 votes are required to name the next prime minister, leaving Shiite coalition four votes short.

The Iraqiya leader, Ayad Allawi, is the secular Shiite former prime minister imposed by the U.S.-led coalition in the interim government after the fall of Saddam Hussein and replaced by al-Maliki in the 2005 elections. Now Allawi is contending that as the leader of the winning Iraqiya ticket he should regain the top job, and that his bloc receive key ministerial appointments in the new government.

Al-Maliki for his part has succeeded in getting another recount on grounds that candidates of his State of Law party were either undercounted or eliminated by fraudulent means. Also, disqualification is being sought of some winning candidates alleged to be old Baath Party members under Saddam Hussein, which could affect the decision on the next prime minister.

Further complicating the situation is the Iraqi National Alliance's presence within the new Shiite coalition. It includes the organization of strongly anti-U.S. clerical leader Muqtada al-Sadr, head of the much-feared sectarian Mahdi Army that al-Maliki forces sought to put down in 2008.

Also, the influence of clerics in choosing the new prime minister provided in the new Shiite coalition agreement has raised fears of a renewed sectarian violence, which could affect the timetable for U.S. military withdrawal.

As matters stand now, the leadership outcome is unlikely to produce a new government in Baghdad that meets the aspirations of either the departed Bush or current Obama administration. Yet Obama remains committed to the pullout of all U.S. combat troops from Iraq by the end of August, the goal he set last year in ordering a 30,000-troop surge into Afghanistan. In any event, some 50,000 American forces are to remain in Iraq through next year to train and advise the Iraqi military and police.

As long as Obama adheres to that schedule and use of Americans in Iraq, public opinion at home will probably go along. But what if his administration doesn't like the outcome of the current Iraqi leadership dispute? The president can't be seen using other than U.S. diplomacy to encourage leadership favorable or at least accommodating to American interests.

Candidate Obama in 2008 owed much of his election victory, especially among liberal Democratic voters, to his commitment to end the American military involvement in Iraq. He didn't promise a heaven in Baghdad, and isn't obligated to do so. Leaving the elected leadership of Iraq to the Iraqis at this point should fulfill whatever obligation the United States still has for "liberating" them.

 

Available at Amazon.com:

The Great Gamble

At War with the Weather: Managing Large-Scale Risks in a New Era of Catastrophes

 

 

(C) 2010 Jules Witcover