Is the US 'Pivot' to the Pacific genuine?

By Michael Green

The Obama administration has written a new chapter in American foreign policy, saying that the United States will now "pivot" away from two wars in the South-west Asia to focus on the rising power of China.

The Asia pivot was first described in an article by Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, in October and became the framing concept for President Obama's visit to Hawaii, Australia and Indonesia in November.

Supporters claim that the President has established a foreign policy vision for the next century. Sceptics point out that there is more political spin than substance to the Obama Asia pivot. Both are right. The increased American focus on Asia is bipartisan and sustainable. The real de-bate is not about the importance of Asia, but how the United States will resource its increasing engagement of the region.

The merits of an increased focus on Asia are clear. The US has seen itself as a Pacific power since The Empress of China first set sail for Canton the year the American Revolution ended, but in the 18th and 19th centuries the Pacific took second place to securing land borders. In the 20th century it was the threat of German and then Soviet expansion against Britain and Western Europe that led Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt and most Cold War presidents to pursue "Europe First" policies.

Under President Clinton, the Europe directorate of the National Security Council was three times larger than the Asia directorate. George W. Bush rebalanced things with Europe and Asia directorates of equal size, but then 9/11 caused the counterterrorism and Iraq/Afghanistan directorates to grow larger than either. It is logical for this administration and the next to restore the focus on Asia, given the power dynamics and economic vitality of the region. The administration - particularly Mrs. Clinton - also deserves credit for enhancing American engagement with Southeast Asia.

This policy continues a pattern of broadening American strategic relations in the region to maintain a balance of power as China's power and influence grows. As China has asserted its territorial claims in the South China Sea, Vietnam and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have embraced the United States in ways that Mrs. Clinton is wisely reciprocating.

The final merit of the Asia pivot is that it has signalled to the Departments of State and Defence that Asia's share of the budget will increase in relative terms. The commander of US forces in the Pacific has been told that the President's proposed $500 billion defence cuts will not come out of his command.

These three aspects of the Asia pivot will almost certainly endure to the next administration, whether Republican or Democratic. However, other aspects raise questions of style and substance.

The first problem is the word "pivot" itself. The word suggests that Europe is now less important. If the administration's main concern is managing the peaceful rise of China, however, then nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, China's challenge to the prevailing structure of international relations requires more - not less - transatlantic co-operation.

Nor do America's Asian friends consider the Middle East unimportant. In fact, more than 90 per cent of Northeast Asia's hydro-carbon imports come from that part of the world and Tokyo, Seoul and even Beijing look to Washington to provide a lead on maintaining stability in the region it is apparently pivoting out of. A grand strategy of pivoting also has to raise questions in Asia about when the pendulum might swing the other way.

The second problem is that the pivot has more to do with process than strategy. The administration has said why Asia is important to the United States, but not yet what future vision the United States has for the region. Woody Allen once quipped that nine-tenths of success in life is just showing up, and the same could be said of diplomacy in Asia. President Obama has done his part by joining the East Asia Summit, in addition to continued links with the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (Apec) forum, but he has not presented a clear picture of how the US will seek to build a region that protects stability while integrating China. Without that inclusive vision, the Chinese have chosen to interpret the pivot as being primarily about containing them.

Part of the administration's problem is that its own Asia strategy has pivoted several times since 2009. The Obama administration symbolically began its engagement with meetings with Japan in March 2009 (Japan's prime minister was the first Oval Office visitor from abroad and Mrs. Clinton's first overseas trip was to Tokyo). By November 2009, however, Obama and China's leader Hu Jintao had signed a joint statement promising to respect each others "core interests" and US officials were arguing that the main priority was "strategic reassurance" with Beijing. To much of the world this looked like a new condominium with Beijing. Then, after China's assertive push for sovereignty over the East and South China Seas and passive support of North Korea after attacks on the South, the administration shifted into balance-of-power mode, and then finally the pivot.

The coincidence of the pivot strategy with the 2012 election campaign and the withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan also gives the concept a heavy political flavour, as the White House seeks to present a more muscular foreign policy. A more consistent strategic approach to Asia would have made for both good politics and good strategy.

Finally, the biggest uncertainty about the Asia pivot is the question of resources. Across Asia, America's friends are saying, "we like the attention ... but can you afford it?" The administration's answer is "yes," since defence cuts are not set to come out of the Pacific Command. However, the Pacific Commander does not actually own his forces. If there is a crisis with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz, the US Air Force and Navy will shift assets from the Pacific to the Arabian Sea. As things stand there would be more than enough capability to deter any Far East aggression if that were to happen, unless defence cuts go too deep.

Mr. Obama has proposed $500 billion in cuts and has done nothing to signal that he would stop twice that amount in automatic cuts if the Congressional "supercommittee" fails to agree on deficit reduction. Pundits assume the White House is playing chicken with Republicans, hoping that the threat to defence spending will force the other side to agree to tax increases and smaller welfare cuts. It is a dangerous game. The $500 billion cuts will already stress US forces in the Pacific; the automatic sequestration cuts of $1 trillion would cut back US naval shipbuilding to the point where the Pacific Command would have to permanently cover both the Western Pacific and Southwest Asia.

Moreover, as the Washington Post pointed out, the administration's new defence strategy assumes that the US will not engage in any more land wars. That will come as a surprise to strategic planners who see continued volatility in the Middle East, not to mention the Korean peninsula.

Still there is no panic in the region. President Obama's November trip was skillfully staged and the images of America hosting Apec in Hawaii, announcing a new base in northern Australia, and then joining the East Asia Summit, have helped provide momentum that blurs some of the substantive questions about the actual American commitment. In the next year or two, however, reality will catch up with spin. If Obama or his successor makes the case for resourcing US commitments in Asia, then the Asia pivot will be viewed in history as one further step in a steady post-Cold War rebalancing of American global strategy. If not, the pivot may end up looking like so much election year politicking.

(Michael Green is Senior Adviser and Japan Chair at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and an Associate Professor at Georgetown University. He served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Asia on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration.)

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