World - Middle East: Palestine Towards Statehood

Middle East: Palestine Towards Statehood
Helen Twist

On June 26, 2011, against a shifting regional landscape, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation announced its decision to seek recognition of statehood at the United Nations (UN) along the 1967 borders, with the right of return for refugees. Whether a historical moment of transformative change or simply another act on the sometimes farcical stage of Palestinian leadership, the effects of this announcement will reach far beyond September, when the General Assembly is due to consider the request.

Recent shifts in Palestinian strategy reflect a response to the changing regional dynamic and the decision to go to the United Nations is both a consequence of the lack of movement on the peace process, particularly over the past two years, and a move to increase the credibility of the Palestinian leadership. Palestine has not remained impervious to the Arab Spring. The changing relationships emerging from the unrest in the Middle East, particularly in regards to Egypt and Syria, create a frame through which the reconciliation agreement and the upcoming elections can be understood. The critical mass seen in Egypt and Tunisia has not yet emerged in Palestine, but there have been protests. The most notable of these was the Nakba demonstrations of May 15, an annual day of protest marking the creation of the state of Israel, in which at least fifteen protesters were killed in clashes with the Israel Defence Force in the Palestinian Territories and others in protests at the external borders of Israel. Increasing confrontations between Israeli settlers in the West Bank and protestors are also indicative of the increasingly fragile nature of peace in the Palestinian Territories.

Some suggest that the Arab world has looked to the Palestinian struggle for inspiration for the revolutionary change sweeping the region. However, this is not the case. In reality the Palestinian leadership is dogged by a disempowered internal and external constituency, isolated from the political process. The focus of the majority of protests has been towards national unity rather than Israel, and the recent rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas concluded in May 2011 can be seen as a calculated response to growing internal dissatisfaction with the status quo. The process of seeking recognition is seen by some as a continuation of this diplomacy in isolation, impacting little or negatively on people's everyday lives.

Concerns about the implications of the outcome are centred around how the declaration of a state will be reflected on ground. It is not clear what steps the Palestinian leadership intends to take come September, and there is a strong possibility of violence breaking out as a result of frustration and unmanaged expectations.

Until now Palestinian strategy with regards to negotiations and the peace process has been reactive rather than proactive. Negotiations have come to be viewed as a pretext for continuing expansion of settlements and occupation; a sentiment that increased following the revelations of the Palestine Papers, which highlighted the Israeli refusal to compromise, despite the numerous and politically damaging concessions offered by the Palestinian negotiators. Furthermore, the process of state development under occupation can itself be seen to be complicit in perpetuating the status quo. However, based on conversations in a recent visit to Jerusalem, the bid for recognition was framed by the Palestinian leadership as symbolic of a new voice, in which plurality and inclusion is celebrated. Recent shifts are again reactive to wider regional events; this move, if handled correctly, could open the door for a new phase of decisive and strategic leadership - a necessity if the murmurs of revolt are to be contained. What remains to be seen is what comes of this opportunity.

The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process have all pronounced certain Palestinian state institutions ready to take on the rights and responsibilities of a functioning state, creating a convincing case for the PLO's bid for recognition. This is much more tangible than the symbolic declaration of statehood in 1988, when state institutions were not reflected on the ground.

The establishment of an independent sovereign Palestinian state by 2011 forms a key element of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's 2009 timetable, detailing the reinforcement of the institutions of the future state over a two year period, in accordance with the timetable set out by the Middle East Quartet, and supported by various initiatives within the European Union (EU). Slightly at odds with the line adopted by the Palestinian leadership, Fayyad has called the bid for recognition a 'symbolic' move, due to its political rather than legal implications.

Palestine currently has 'other entity' permanent observer status at the UN, effectively acting as a non-voting member of the General Assembly. Full recognition and membership, in which Palestine is recognised as a state and granted full membership of the United Nations, requires a positive recommendation from the Security Council (support of nine Security Council members, without a veto from a permanent member), followed by the endorsement of a two thirds majority in the General Assembly (128 of 192 votes). There are two other possible outcomes: if one of the five permanent members of the Security Council exercises its veto there is the possibility of the recognition only option, in which Palestine is recognised by the General Assembly as a state but is accorded non-member state observer status (it is worth noting that UN General Assembly decisions are non-binding and thus have little legal effect). In the absence of Security Council support the final option is to challenge the veto through the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution, used to convene an emergency session of the General Assembly in the instance that the Security Council is deemed to have failed to have met its responsibilities.

The full membership option looks unlikely, given the resistance of the United States to the declaration. However, it is possible that the recognition option will go through. Recognition, whilst of political rather than legal significance, would give momentum for recourse to international legal mechanisms for dispute resolution, including the International Court of Justice. Palestinian frustration at Israel's continued non-adherence to UN resolutions relating to the conflict, dating as far back as the recognition of Israel as a member state - in which the right of return of refugees and the implementation of partition plan were explicitly stated as prerequisites for full membership - makes other avenues to explore compliance attractive.

The Palestinian leadership has spoken of drawing on other models of 'international struggle' such as the experience of South Africa and India as examples of how to use international law as a means to increase international support. This is what the campaign in September is about. Although there may not be a change in the legal position, recognition would shift the language used, changing the emphasis from 'disputed territories' to occupied land in a sovereign state and hardening the international perspective of Israeli occupation. It is hoped that recognition could also necessitate withdrawal from a sovereign Palestinian territory. However, there has been some scepticism expressed about the possibility of the international mechanisms being able to compel Israel to abide by its international obligations, even within a legal framework.

If the resolution is to have legitimacy and political weight, EU support is essential to counter balance American opposition - the position adopted by France, Germany and the United Kingdom will be particularly critical in the credibility of the outcome. It has been suggested that the need for EU support may temper more controversial aspects of a possible resolution, in order to make it appealing to potential EU supporters. The EU response can be divided into four distinct groups: the active, passive and possible 'yes' countries; the passive countries who will abstain or oppose the process due to a possible compromise to their own interests; those seeking a common European approach to recognition; and those who are actively opposed to recognition (Germany has crucially taken this stance).

There are very clear concerns from Israel, echoed by the United States, with regard to the implication of recognition on the Oslo Accord and for Israel politically - on the international stage and domestically. The perceived shift away from negotiations has been of major concern to the US and Israel, a position informed by the belief that unilateral Palestinian steps will endanger the negotiations - making the task of preserving framework for negotiations in the future much harder - undermine the two state model and isolate the US from the peace process. The 'unilateral' Palestinian action has been met with a diplomatic rebuttal from Israel, giving an indication of just how serious a challenge this declaration is seen to pose.

It has been emphasised by the Palestinian leadership that the bid for recognition seeks to support and strengthen the Palestinian negotiating position rather than undermine the security of Israel, as a supplement to, rather than a substitute, for negotiations. Israel fears that on the battlefield of the United Nations, already perceived to be biased in the Palestinians favour, the Palestinians will find an equality not found in other arenas.

It would seem that America and Israel are committed only to democracy and self determination on their own terms - adopting the position that this unilateral action threatens the establishment of a viable two-state solution and refusing to engage with a unified Palestinian leadership which includes a democratically elected Hamas. The American and Israeli position can be understood primarily through the countries' own interests, for whilst recognition has the potential to completely change the negotiating parameters, going to UN does not pre-empt settlement. More valid are concerns that if recognition is successful, the more immediate aftermath could be extremely damaging to the efforts made on the peace process to date, prompting a deepening of the conflict and polarisation of positions. However, negotiations would eventually take a state to state format and perhaps this radical long term view is necessary to break away from the current impasse in negotiations, particularly regarding the issue of settlements. Wider concerns also relate to dangers of an attempt to force political transformation within Israel; a demonstration of international community support to pressure Israel with the revitalisation of sanctions and boycotts issue could play on Israeli vulnerabilities and result in a hardened Israeli position, with unpredictable consequences.

The implications of this decision are myriad; however, it is indicative of a clear shift away from American influence in the negotiations and marks the potential beginning of a more nuanced, European brokerage of the peace process. Continued American support for Israel risks placing America against popular aspirations elsewhere in region, challenging its influence in Palestinian-Israeli affairs and regionally. Israel has been notable in its lack of engagement in a time of flux and transition, and it would seem that if it is not going to be left behind, it needs to take the initiative and start to actively engage with the peace process agenda, bringing tangible, constructive change to the table. The international response to the Arab Spring has been deeply incoherent and inconsistent. It is these inconstancies between cases, based on short term interests, which stand in the way of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state, and in the way of a lasting and constructive engagement between the international community and a newly emergent Middle East.

(Helen Twist is the Programme Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House.)

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