By Jennifer Kohnke

Robert Gates is the U.S. secretary of defense. The following interview was conducted by Julian Barnes of the Tribune Co. Washington Bureau

Q. You've made some dramatic changes in Afghanistan this year. In hindsight, should you have done that earlier?

A. I think people have forgotten their history. In January of '07, I extended a brigade of the 10th Mountain Division and I added another brigade that spring. The notion that I neglected Afghanistan is mistaken. The problem is that is all I had to send.

Over the last year or so, we have significantly increased their capabilities on ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.) We began working months ago on the all-terrain MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle). We began working in January on the medevac (medical evacuation).

I told people when I first got on the job that I was worried about both Iraq and Afghanistan. And I talked about my concerns over Afghanistan -- specifically that we were too focused on the central government and not enough on the provinces and districts. I was worried about Afghans not seeing us as their partner.

Within the framework of the surge in Iraq, what I did in Afghanistan was about all I could do with the forces we had available at the time.

There was a big increase well before this administration, but it was nothing compared to what President Obama has been able to do.

Q. When James Jones, the national security adviser, was quoted telling Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, that there would be no more troops available to be sent to Afghanistan, was he inappropriately putting a limit on the commanders? Did you talk to Gen. Jones about that?

A. I did not speak to him about it. But I personally talked to Gen. (David) Petraeus, (the head of Central Command) and McChrystal, and said do your hard scrub and let us know what you think. Give us your honest assessment and we will be able to make a recommendation

I did not want either of them to feel constrained in making their recommendations. That is not to say we will accept all of their recommendations.

Q. Do you think the moves you made in recent months have put more time on the clock for Afghanistan? Does the public have the patience to see the conflict through?

A. The clock in Washington on Afghanistan is going to depend on what happens on the ground. I think we need to show we are making some headway by next spring or early summer. We are not going to win it by next summer. We aren't going to be on the verge of winning it next summer; this is a long-term prospect.

But if we can show progress, and we are headed in the right direction, and we are not in a stalemate where we are taking significant casualties, then you can put more time on the Washington clock.

After the Iraq experience, nobody is prepared to have a long slog where it is not apparent we are making headway. The United States has been at war for eight years. The troops are tired, the American people are pretty tired.

Q. Is the NATO alliance functioning better in Afghanistan?

A. I do have the sense that things are working better. The allies are looking for ways within the framework of their own domestic politics to enhance their capabilities.

It may be relatively small numbers, but I get the sense they are really looking, whether it is civilians, gendarmerie for training, paramilitary police or incremental troop increases.

And there has been an extraordinary amount of political courage as some of our partners have taken some really devastating casualties relative to the size of their contribution. The Canadians, the Dutch, the Danes. And the British have had a very rough couple of weeks.

 

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