Anthony Luzzatto Gardner and Stuart E. Eizenstat
On
The Lisbon Treaty is the latest in a long line of EU reform efforts. It is the fifth amendment to the 1957 Treaty of
In 2007, after a two-year "period of reflection," the EU heads of state agreed in
European officials generally agree that the Lisbon Treaty will be the EU's last significant institutional reform for the foreseeable future. In several member states, it is considered the high-water mark of the European integration project, and the prospect of transferring more power to
Cameron's proposals highlight a central issue regarding the Lisbon Treaty and the EU in general: their ultimate effectiveness will depend on whether politicians and voters in the member states embrace integration or focus instead on maintaining their own national prerogatives.
LESSONS OF FAILURE
Starting with just six member states in 1958 and now with 27, the EU (and its predecessor, the
Member states began coordinating their foreign policies in the 1970s through an informal process known as the European Political Cooperation, which the Maastricht Treaty later formalized into a distinct intergovernmental decision-making process. Even then, however, the impact of EU foreign policy remained limited. Despite issuing countless declarations and "common positions" setting out official recommendations, the EU was usually unable to shape world events. Its role was largely confined to responding to crises, rather than preventing them or marshaling EU resources proactively to achieve defined objectives.
This harsh reality was highlighted during the breakup of
The
The EU's main institutional flaw was the way the
In 1999, in an effort to make itself a more coherent international actor, the EU appointed
However, the deep divisions among member states that surfaced during the
HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
The Lisbon Treaty created the post of high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy, who serves a five year term as EU foreign minister and is supported by a large corps of diplomats. This new high representative, who also serves as a vice president of the
The new high representative's main tools are a budget estimated at
Several factors, however, may limit the high representative's effectiveness in practice. First, although the high representative has the central foreign policy role in the
The Lisbon Treaty partly ends the inefficient system of six-monthly rotations in the leadership of the
Another challenge, as ever, will be managing the diversity of interests among the 27 EU member states. Any further accessions, of course (including those of
These challenges would be diminished if the high representative were an experienced, respected figure capable of crafting consensus. EU leaders missed the opportunity to gain such a figure when, in
The Lisbon Treaty does little to resolve the tense relationship between the foreign policies of the individual member states and that of the EU as a whole. Although the treaty offers tools for making EU foreign policy more effective, member states may still pursue their own policies. On nearly every foreign and security policy issue, in fact, the high representative is able to act only with the unanimous consent of the member states. This means that a single small country--such as
Still, the Lisbon Treaty has altered the system. By virtue of her responsibilities and resources, Ashton will receive substantial attention from non-EU countries, including
LOOKING FOR A LEADER
The Lisbon Treaty may also strengthen the EU as an international actor through its creation of a new, full-time post of president of the
The treaty does not define the new president's role in great detail, but it does enumerate some tasks: chairing the
The Lisbon Treaty tasks the
The uncertainty regarding the relationship between the high representative and the president demonstrates that, for all of its virtues, the Lisbon Treaty has not fully streamlined the EU's leadership. Creating the high representative and the full-time post of president were helpful steps, but the treaty is still unlikely to solve a major problem of the EU: overrepresentation. In forums such as the G-20, the EU's claims to being a single, coherent actor have been undercut by the high number of European officials in attendance, including representatives from the country holding the rotating
THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON
From the founding of the
Once the European economic miracle was flourishing, however, U.S. support for the "vast new enterprise" became tinged with concerns that
The approaches of recent U.S. administrations toward the EU have varied. The Clinton administration (in which we both served) unambiguously favored the development of a common EU foreign and security policy, even one that might sometimes conflict or compete with that of
With the current administration, as many former Clinton administration officials have returned to the U.S. government, the pendulum has swung back. In 2003,
The U.S. government will be paying particular attention to whether the Lisbon Treaty enhances the EU's ability to implement a common security policy that might ultimately lead to a common EU defense. The treaty would ultimately hurt U.S. interests if it led to a full-fledged European military structure outside the
In fact, the Lisbon Treaty explicitly reaffirms that for those countries that are members of both the EU and
Individual member states will continue to remain in control of their security and defense policymaking. Even under the Lisbon Treaty, they retain control over their military assets and are free to decide whether to provide resources to EU missions and whether to participate in ad hoc coalitions involved in common security and defense operations.
Although still nascent, the EU-NATO relationship is cooperative. Officials at various levels of the two organizations meet regularly, and there are permanent military liaison arrangements that facilitate cooperation at an operational level. Deeper institutional ties, however, will require the cooperation of
The Lisbon Treaty expands the scope of the security-related tasks the EU is now permitted to undertake to include joint disarmament operations, military advising and assistance, conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilization. Beyond its civilian missions, the EU has also operated in six military missions to date: replacing
The Lisbon Treaty may also serve U.S. interests by helping solve a problem that has long been of bipartisan concern in
If that is the case, the only way to improve the EU's ability to project hard power will be to ensure that it spends its money more efficiently. This could happen if EU countries were to consolidate their defense industries, liberalize the market for military procurement, and collaborate more often on research, development, and manufacturing. To avoid wasting funds on programs that often serve as life support for local defense industries, EU countries should pool their resources whenever practicable.
The Lisbon Treaty encourages such behavior. It tasks the
FACING THE FUTURE
For decades, the EU has exercised its soft power by giving large sums of foreign aid, entering into privileged trade arrangements (especially with former colonies), and wielding diplomatic incentives (especially with countries seeking membership). But its response to international crises has too often consisted of ad hoc policies and toothless communiqués. Although soft power will remain relevant, the EU faces many threats that will require proactive measures backed by the credible threat of force.
The Lisbon Treaty is an important step forward, but EU member states still need to develop a common view of their international security environment. It would be unrealistic to expect member states' deeply rooted policies to become entirely consistent, but there are signs of convergence. In 2003, for example, the
European foreign policies are gradually becoming more "Europeanized." Member states' foreign ministers now gather under EU auspices as regularly as they meet with their own cabinets. Even though times of crisis will continue to reveal high-profile disagreements among member states, the general instinct in European foreign ministries is increasingly to find a common European position on most issues, even at the price of making compromises. The EU's member states nearly always vote in unison in UN bodies and other international forums, such as the
If the EU is capable of acting as an effective partner,
NOWHERE TO HIDE
Now that the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force, nearly a decade of EU obsession with institutional reform has ended. For many years, arduous negotiations over treaties and the EU's decision-making process served as useful excuses for poor EU performance on many issues. During our tenures in the U.S. government, we were struck by how often member states criticized EU institutions (especially the
If the EU has fallen short of its potential in the past, it is because member states' national governments have wanted it to. The Lisbon Treaty's improved procedures and institutions can only supplement--not substitute for--political will and leadership. The treaty's promise will remain unfulfilled if member states seek foreign policy consensus only at the lowest common denominator, jealously hold on to their national perspectives, or make eu appointments based not on the international standing of the candidates but on their nationality, political affiliation, or gender.
If European leaders fail to make full use of the Lisbon Treaty's potential, they will consign
The significance of the Lisbon Treaty should not be measured only according to the highest benchmarks, such as whether it could have ensured a common EU policy during the wars in the Balkans and
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